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Abstract: This article examines the provision of strategic costing information in the context of the 
emergence and growth of the British electrical power industry and its pre-eminent exemplar, the 
Newcastle Upon Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCo).  A detailed case study of NESCo’s costing for 
strategy development and analysis is presented. This research finds that NESCo’s adoption of 
systematic, formal considerations of strategy and its use of costing for strategy development and 
analysis were related to a combination of three factors: first, the novelty, scale and complexity of the 
electricity supply industry; second, the regulated environment of the electricity supply industry; and 
third, the ability and drive of key individuals. The implications of this research for contemporary 
studies of strategic management accounting are considered. 
Key words: strategic costing; strategic management accounting; Second Industrial Revolution; 
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1. Introduction  
The historical literature dealing with the period from the First British Industrial Revolution through to 
1914 incorporates analyses of the use of costing information in firms’ one-off strategic decision 
making. These analyses deal largely with industries such as coal, iron and steel (e.g. Boyce, 1992; Boyns 
and Edwards, 1995; Boyns and Edwards, 1997; Edwards, Boyns and Anderson. 1995; Pitts, 2001) and 
shipbuilding and engineering (e.g. McLean, 2006; McLean, McGovern and Davie, 2015). Chandler 
(1992, p. 81) notes that whilst these ‘old industries were transformed’ during the late nineteenth - 
early twentieth century, also ‘new industries were created.’  In fact, this period ‘saw the lusty 
childhood, if not the birth, of . . . (the) cluster of innovations that have earned the name of the Second 
Industrial Revolution’ (Landes, 2003, p. 235). Boyns, Matthews and Edwards (2004, p. 4) state that 
‘the three generally accepted new industries [of the Second Industrial Revolution are] electrical 
engineering, vehicles and chemicals and allied trades.’ They indicate the importance of researching 
these new industries, noting that ‘examining a new industry outside of the [old] staple trades, such as 
coal or iron and steel, and mechanical engineering, provides a different perspective on the source of 
ideas surrounding certain costing techniques.’  
There is a very limited costing literature on these new industries (Boyns et al, 2004, p. 5). For example, 
McKinstry (1999) examined costing and accounting development in a British vehicle maker and found, 
inter alia, that costing information did not play a significant role in strategic decision making. 
Matthews, Boyns and  Edwards (2003) and Boyns et al (2004) researched the development of costing 
and accounting controls in the British chemical industry and found evidence of experiments with ‘long-
term profit forecasts’ (2004, p. 18) and the use of costing information in one-off strategic investment 
decisions (2004, pp. 18 – 19). In the late nineteenth – early twentieth century, the engineering firm of 
Clarke Chapman, based in North East England, employed a limited amount of management accounting 
information in making strategic investment and disinvestment decisions in respect of both motor cars 
and electrical engineering (McLean et al, 2015). However, there is a dearth of research dealing with 
costing and strategy in the new industry of electricity supply. This represents a real gap in our 
knowledge of the development of costing, a gap that is both surprising and important to fill since ‘the 
most revolutionary of the new technologies [of the Second Industrial Revolution] were those that 
generated and transmitted electricity for lighting, urban traction and industrial power’ (Chandler, 
1992, p. 81). 
The aim of this research is to begin to address this significant gap in our knowledge by means of an 
examination of the provision of costing information for strategy development and analysis during the 
emergence of the pre-eminent exemplar of the British electrical supply industry, the Newcastle Upon 
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Tyne Electric Supply Company (NESCo). NESCo was selected as a research site for three reasons. First, 
as a pioneer in the emerging electrical power industry, it developed and implemented innovative and 
unique technological and business strategies (Beard, 1918; Byatt, 1979; Hannah, 1979; The Statist, 
1911). Second, it emerged as the only financially successful electrical power company in Great Britain, 
achieving exponential growth (Tables 1, 2 and 3), national economic importance and international 
standing (Byatt, 1979, pp. 114 – 115). Third, NESCo’s extensive and under-explored public archive was 
available to the researchers. A limited amount of research on some aspects of NESCo’s history has 
been undertaken previously (Byatt, 1979; Hannah, 1979), but this work was severely circumscribed 
since, as Hannah noted (1979, p. 365), ‘The archives of NESCo do not appear to have survived’. 
Fortunately, in fact, the NESCo archives did survive and are now held in Newcastle Upon Tyne by Tyne 
and Wear Archives as part of the North Eastern Electricity Board Collection, catalogued as DU.EB.  
The historical literature emphasises the important role of actors (Yamey, 1981), change agents (Boyns 
and Edwards, 1996) and key individuals and particular professions (McLean, 2013; McLean and Tyson, 
2006) in accounting and costing. In the limited literature dealing with this topic in relation to the new 
industries of the Second Industrial Revolution, McKinstry (1999) notes that Albion Motors had an 
engineering-oriented culture and that the firm’s costing system was based in the discipline of 
engineering rather than accounting; the research of Boyns et al (2004, p. 22) threw ‘some light on the 
roles of certain individuals [but was] far from conclusive as to the role of different professional groups’ 
in developing costing systems; McLean et al (2015, p. 188) found that ‘[strategic] management 
accounting information was not developed  . . . but information from the routine management 
accounting system . . . was used explicitly in [one-off] strategic continue/dis-continue decisions’ and 
they recommended ‘that future research should investigate the roles of the engineering and 
accounting professions in the development of management accounting in particular organisational 
contexts’. The current authors aim to provide insights into the roles played by individuals and 
professional groups in the development of NESCo’s strategic costing and, thereby, provide a useful 
addition to the literature. 
Thus, this research has two objectives: 
 First, to add to the limited literature relating to costing in the new industries of the Second 
Industrial Revolution by means of the presentation of a detailed case study of NESCo’s costing 
for strategy development and analysis during the emergence phase of the company’s life 
cycle, 1889 - 1914 
 Second, to investigate the roles and importance of key individuals and professional groups in 
the generation of NESCo’s costing information for strategy development and analysis.  
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However, this article will extend beyond historical research and analysis. There is an extensive 
contemporary, twenty-first century, literature dealing with strategic costing/strategic management 
accounting (SMA) (e.g. Bimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007; Cadez and Guilding, 2008; Guilding, Cravens  
and Tayles, 2000; Langfield-Smith, 2008; Lord, 2007; Naranjo-Gil and Hartmann, 2007; Nielsen, 
Mitchell and Nørreklit, 2015; Nixon and Burns, 2012a; Nixon and Burns, 2012b;  Roslender and Hart, 
2002;  Seal, 2001, 2010; Tayles, 2011; Tillmann and Goddard, 2008). Nevertheless, contemporarily, 
‘there is still no agreed conceptual framework about what constitutes SMA’ (Ma and Tayles, 2009, 
p.474) and it is beset by ‘an inherent contradiction between the apparent decline of SMA and the 
sustained growth in the number of concepts, models, tools, theoretical perspectives, disciplines, 
academic and professional journals and consultancy practices that populate the SMA domain . . . [SMA 
is a] paradox’ (Nixon and Burns, 2012a, p.229). Furthermore, there is little understanding about the 
engagement of accountants in strategic issues (Tillmann and Goddard, 2008). The authors will employ 
the historical findings of this study in the consideration of these contemporary issues.  
The remainder of this article is organised into ten further sections: Methodology; The British electricity 
supply industry; NESCo: an electric lighting company, 1889 – 1898; NESCo: a regional power company, 
1898 – 1914; Costing, Strategy and the emergence of NESCo as a power company, 1898 -1905; Costing, 
strategy and the growth of NESCo, 1906 – 1908; Costing, strategy and the growth of NESCo, 1908 – 
1914; NESCo: Costing and management control; The regulatory-political environment and strategic 
costing; Discussion and Conclusions. 
2. Methodology 
NESCo survived as a business entity until 1st April 1948 when it was nationalised under the authority 
of the Electricity Act of 1947 (NESCo, 1948). However, the authors have employed an end date of 1914 
for this research for three reasons. First, the First World War had a significant impact on national 
politics, economy and society and is generally regarded as being a natural break-point in historical 
analysis (e.g. Hobsbawm, 1985, 1987). Second, it is widely recognised that industries and markets 
were hugely distorted by the First World War (Slaven, 2013). Third, the year 1914 marks the end of a 
‘benchmark time period [for the electricity supply industry, since by] 1914 cities had electricity, long-
distance transmission had become established, and regional networks had begun to take shape’ 
(Hausman, Hertner, and Wilkins, 2008, p. 30).  
Based on the end date of 1914, the case was developed within two major, distinct time periods, as is 
explained fully in Section 5.1 below.  The first period, 1889 – 1898, covers NESCo’s formation and its 
emergence as a local electric lighting company; the second period, 1898 – 1914, encompasses the 
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development and adoption of radical new strategies that heralded the emergence of NESCo as a 
regional electric power company of national significance.  
Following the methodology advocated by Langley (1999) for the analysis of process data, the authors 
built a narrative of the emergence and growth of NESCo. This narrative is based on a detailed study of 
the firm’s vast, albeit incomplete, archive (DU.EB), from inception in 1889 through until 1914, and the 
relevant literature (e.g. Beard, 1918; Byatt, 1979; Engineering, 1911; Hannah, 1979; The Statist, 1911). 
Separately and jointly, the researchers examined minutes of Directors’ meetings, costing reports to 
Directors, minutes of management meetings, Directors’ reports to annual general meetings, annual 
financial reports, and other documentation. These examinations were discussed and differences were 
resolved after joint re-scrutiny and re-assessment. The specific focus of this work is on the nature of 
costing information prepared for strategy development and analysis, hereafter termed as strategic 
costing, and on the people who prepared this information rather than on the strategic decision-making 
process itself. 
3. The British electricity supply industry  
Following Faraday’s experiments in electromagnetic induction in 1831, engineers developed small 
dynamos for the generation of electricity (Byatt, 1979, p. 1). It was not until the late 1870s that 
improved dynamo design led to reductions in generating costs and the belief that electricity had 
arrived as a viable competitor to gas for the provision of lighting. The Electric Lighting Act of 1882, 
which eased the legal requirements for the formation of electricity supply companies, coincided with 
a short period of recovery within the great British depression of 1873 – 1896 (Hughes, 1962, p.33) and 
there was a boom in applications for company formation, including eighty three in the first month 
after the passage of the Act: ‘private enterprise had the opportunity of risking capital in an area of the 
economy on the technological frontier’ (Hughes, 1979, p.31). 
The Brush Electric Lighting Company was at the forefront of developments and there was a mania in 
its shares which came to be known as the ‘Brush Bubble’ (Hughes, 1962, p. 29): in May 1882, the 
company’s £10 shares rose to a market price of £68 (Byatt, 1979, p.18). However, the industry soon 
began to experience technological problems (Hughes, 1962, p. 33). Moreover, ‘the success of the 
boom depended crucially on the supposition that electric lighting cost no more than gas lighting  . . . 
[but] hopes about the extent of economies of scale proved . . to have been greatly exaggerated, and 
soon all the companies found their installations losing money. Many of them collapsed fairly soon. 
The year 1883 was calamitous’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 18). There were only four successful applications to 
form electricity supply companies in 1883, none at all in 1884 (Byatt, 1979, 9. 21) and in 1884 the 
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Brush Electric Lighting Company ‘had to devalue the £10 share by a half’ (Hughes, 1979, p. 33). From 
1882 onwards, the British electrical supply industry suffered from ‘circumspection and caution’ 
together with ‘a confluence of [adverse] legislative, technological, and economic [factors]’ (Hughes, 
1962, p. 39).  
In 1888, the 1882 Act was amended in order to enable companies to extend their tenure of central 
power stations from twenty-one to forty-two years in order to make investment in the industry more 
attractive. However, many local authorities hindered or blocked such investment in order to protect 
their own municipal gas undertakings (Hannah, 1979, p.8) and the electricity supply industry was 
restricted by this competition from gas (Shiman, 1993, p. 320 - 324). Thus, through until the 1890s, 
the British electrical supply industry consisted of a multiplicity of organisations operating on a small 
scale within a small market (Wilson, 1988) and it was ‘little more than a collection of huts and 
basements with clanking reciprocating steam engines supplying lamps within a relatively small radius, 
providing challenges to the intellect of the engineer and an expensive, luxury illuminant for 
consumers, but with few spin-offs affecting the life and work of the nation in any significant way’ 
(Hannah, 1979, p. 10). 
4. NESCo: an electric lighting company, 1889 – 1898 
Taking advantage of the 1888 legislation, NESCo was incorporated in January 1889, at the instigation 
of Robert Spence Watson, a Newcastle solicitor, and his brother-in-law Dr Theodore Merz, a Newcastle 
chemist and industrialist, in order to supply electric lighting (Beard, 1918). In February 1889, 
Monkhouse Goddard, the Newcastle firm of Public Accountants, presented a Report (DU.EB/1/1) to 
the Directors of NESCo detailing estimates for the new company: initial capital expenditure 
requirements, £5,000; annual revenue, £2,500; annual operating costs, £1,400; and annual profit, 
£1,100. Working papers for this Report do not show any bases for these estimates or any calculations 
underlying them but do set out details of NESCo’s proposed prices, as indicated by its Board of Trade 
Licence application, in relation to consumers’ quarterly usage of units of electricity: 5 shillings up to 
10 units; 4 shillings and 2 pence between 11 – 20 units; 2 shillings and 9.3 pence over 20 units, and it 
was noted in this case that the equivalent price of gas was 2 shillings and 8.4 pence.  The working 
papers also show that NESCo’s estimated cost of electricity was 1 shilling and 6.5 pence per unit 
whereas the equivalent cost of gas was 1 shilling and 5.75 pence. The Report and its working papers 
do not provide any strategic commentary, but they do indicate an awareness of the need for external 
as well as internal data and for comparisons with gas, electricity’s major competitor in the lighting 
market.  
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A subsequent report (DU.EB/1/1), in April 1889, reveals that NESCo had gathered pricing data from 
two other electricity supply firms. The prices of  a Chelsea firm were seen as irrelevant because of the 
‘expensive conditions’ pertaining there but when it was pointed out that a company in nearby 
Sunderland ‘proposed to charge twice the price of gas, it was proposed by Dr Watson and  carried 
unanimously that the  . . . following rates [should be charged by NESCo]:- 3/6 (3 shillings and 6 pence), 
1 up to 10 units; 3/3 (3 shillings and 3 pence), 10 up to 20 units; 3s [3 shillings]for all over 20 units; 
with 10% discount for cash payments as in the case of gas . . . Upon this decision, the Canvass for 
Customers was directed to be proceeded with immediately’. Thus, NESCo’s pricing strategy was not 
determined by its  License prices or by detailed cost calculations but, rather, it was decided on the 
basis of market-based strategic information. 
In October 1889, a Report (DU.EB/1/1) to the Directors by F.R. Goddard, of Monkhouse Goddard, 
noted that NESCo’s estimated initial capital expenditure requirements had been revised to £9,115. 
Goddard also presented revised estimates of profit for the first 12 months of operations, based on 
three different scenarios: ‘First Scheme, 2,000 lights working 750 hours . . Loss per annum £720. 
Second Scheme, 2,500 lights working 1,000 hours . . Profit per annum £96. Third Scheme, 4,000 lights 
working 750 hours . . . Profit per annum £484.’ This Report consists simply of the financial numbers 
and does not contain any narrative detail or commentary, strategic or otherwise. However, also in 
October 1889, NESCo’s engineers, Messrs Heaviside and Jackson, presented the Directors with a 
comprehensive, eleven pages, ‘Engineer’s Report on the Financial Position of the Company’ 
(DU.EB/1/1) in which they provided a detailed analysis of the capital expenditure and the work 
underlying it. Furthermore, the three potential ‘Schemes’ reported by Goddard were subjected to 
extensive and detailed re-analysis from financial, engineering and business perspectives and a clear 
strategic conclusion was stated, 
 . . . the course recommended is to push the business so as to quickly overtake No. 1 Plant [Scheme], 
bring No. 2 [Plant/Scheme] into use and provide a third plant [Scheme] as a stand by, then the standing 
charges will be divided over twice the area, and not only economical , but safe working ensured . . . 
The success of the Company as an immediate dividend earning undertaking depends much upon the 
area of distribution [and Scheme No. 3 provides the greatest area of distribution at 2,823 yards of 
cable]. 
Subsequent to these deliberations, NESCo opened its first electricity generating station in 1890, at 
Pandon Dene in Newcastle. At this time, Charles Parsons, the brilliant Newcastle-based engineer, 
began the operation of his Newcastle and District Electric Light Company (DISCo). The two companies 
made a supply agreement whereby NESCo limited its operations to the eastern part of Newcastle 
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whilst DISCo was confined to the western part (Beard, 1918). Under this non-competition agreement, 
and with the consent of Newcastle Corporation, NESCo began the supply of electricity for lighting and 
continued with this business on a small scale through to 1898 (Tables 1,2 and 3).  
The archive contains no further strategic analyses for this period of very limited activity and 
development. Beyond the calculation of unit costs (DU.EB/1/1), there is no evidence at all of the use 
of costing for management control purposes. However, from 1898 NESCo undertook a critical change 
in strategic direction that led to its transformation from a local street lighting company to a regional 
power company of national and international importance (Tables 1, 2 and 3). This fundamental 
strategic change and its consequences are explored in the following sections. 
INSERT TABLES 1, 2 AND 3 HERE 
5. NESCo: a regional power company, 1898 - 1914 
5.1 Introduction: strategic change 
1898 marked a clear break-point in the history of NESCo. From its base as a very small company that 
simply provided street lighting in Newcastle, in 1898 NESCo made a strategic change of direction with 
the intention of becoming a regional player (Beard, 1918, p. 2) in ‘the most revolutionary of the new 
technologies [of the Second Industrial Revolution]  . . . those that generated and transmitted electricity 
for lighting, urban traction and industrial power’ (Chandler, 1992, p. 81). In March 1903, a NESCo 
Report (DU.EB/36/1, p. 14) stated that, 
 [In 1898] the Company decided to become a Power Company  . . . it is only necessary to look at the 
progress of the business . . . to realise that for all practical purposes the Company was beginning again 
(emphasis added). 
NESCo’s strategic decision to become a power company was a response to developments in the 
market-place. In 1898, Newcastle Corporation received Parliamentary approval for the construction 
of a power station for the purpose of supplying electricity to its own tramway system. This carried 
with it the potential threat of the Corporation’s intrusion into the entire electricity supply market, 
therefore ‘the use of electricity for general power purposes in the whole district became the only 
practicable important development’ (Beard, 1918, p. 4) for electricity supply companies operating in 
the area. A new enterprise, the Tyneside Electric Power Company, headed by Charles Parsons, applied 
to Parliament for permission to develop a scheme for the whole district. Simultaneously, the Walker 
and Wallsend Union Gas Company was keen to diversify into the supply of electricity throughout the 
district. The Gas Company’s involvement in electricity was spearheaded by a director, J. Wigham 
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Richardson, who was a brother-in-law to NESCo’s founders, Robert Spence Watson and Theodore 
Merz. Also at this time, NESco’s directors realised that ‘they must seriously consider their policy’ and 
understood that it was ‘necessary for us either to go in for a much larger scheme or to merge our small 
undertaking into [a] larger organisation’ (Beard, 1918, pp 2 - 3). NESCo’s family ‘connection’ (Beard, 
1918, p. 4) with the Gas Company enabled the two firms to join forces in a joint enterprise to fulfil the 
‘larger scheme’. However, Beard (1918, p.2) states that  
None of the experts or directors . . . possessed either the knowledge or the ability to lay down the 
lines upon which a large undertaking, meeting all of the requirements of the whole district, should be 
constructed. We had, indeed, all of the elements of success in our hands, but we had no personal 
representative who could grasp the whole situation and devote himself exclusively and continuously 
to the development of a well-considered scheme . . . Fortunately in Charles [Merz] such a person was 
found.  
Charles Merz was the son of Theodore Merz and had recently formed the consulting electrical  
engineering partnership of Merz and McLellan. Given the legal expertise of Robert Spence Watson 
and the expert witness evidence provided by Charles Merz, Parliament threw out the Parsons scheme 
and the joint enterprise of NESCo and the Gas Company ‘gained the statutory powers to develop that 
large scheme of [electric] power-supply which Charles [Merz] had worked out in his mind as the right 
course and aim for our company’ (Beard, 1918, pp. 4-5): ‘for all practical purposes the Company was 
beginning again’ (DU.EB/36/1, p. 14). Charles Merz acted as consulting electrical engineer to NESCo 
from its change of strategic direction in 1898 until his death in the London Blitz of 1940. 
Acting on Merz’s advice, between 1898 – 1914 NESCo adopted strategies that led to its transformation 
from a local street lighting company to a regional power company of national and international 
importance (Byatt, 1979, pp. 114 – 115). The company experienced rapid and exponential growth and 
the extent of NESCo’s achievements must be viewed in the context that it was the only financially 
successful electricity supply company in Great Britain during this period. In 1898, net profit was £5k 
with a return on shareholders’ equity of 8%; by 1914, these figures were £132k and 13% respectively 
(Tables 1 and 2). The growth in total assets was remarkable, from £259k in 1898 to £7,795k in 1914 
(Table 3).  
5.2 Charles Merz: the ‘British Edison’  
The historical literature depicts the importance to accounting and costing of ‘actors’ (Yamey, 1981), 
‘change agents’ (Boyns and Edwards, 1996), and key individuals and networks (McLean, 2013). During 
the Second Industrial Revolution, key players from different bodies of expertise, such as engineering 
10 
 
and accounting, played significant roles in costing (Fleming, McKinstry and Wallace, 2000; McKinstry, 
1999; McLean, 2013; McLean et al, 2015; McLean and Tyson, 2006).  
Charles Merz was the ‘British Edison’ (Hannah, 1979, p. 33) and he was the key player in the 
emergence and growth of NESCo as a power company. Moreover, he was the dominant figure in 
NESCo’s production and use of costing information for strategy development and analysis. Charles 
Merz was born in 1874 into a wealthy Quaker family and during his career he worked with and 
extended its strong and influential family, business, financial, social and political networks throughout 
the North East of England, the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States (Byatt, 1979; Hannah, 
1979; Hughes, 1993). He attended Bootham School in York before spending 1891 at the Durham 
College of Science, now part of Newcastle University. Merz’s father, J.T. Merz, and uncle, R.S. Watson, 
were founding director-shareholders of NESCo and in 1892 he became an engineering ‘pupil’ (Beard, 
1918, p. 2) with NESCo and then with Robey’s of Lincoln, after which he joined the British Thompson-
Houston Company. However, in 1898, at the age of 24, Merz rejected the opportunity of direct 
employment by NESCo, as he ‘did not wish to be tied up to only one concern or scheme’ (Beard, 1918, 
p. 5), in order to set up the consulting engineering partnership of Merz and McLellan. 
Charles Merz was appointed as Consulting Engineer to NESCo (Beard, 1918, p. 7) and ‘He was to 
become the engineering brain behind the whole scheme; a man with just the right combination of 
vision, optimism, and technical skill’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 117). At this time, most of the strategic decisions 
undertaken in the emergence and development of the electrical industry required ‘a mixture of 
engineering and economics’ but there was a shortage of ‘good commercial engineers’ in Great Britain 
(Byatt, 1979, p.184). However, Merz was not found wanting in this respect; he was more than a 
technological ‘lone genius’ like Ferranti, his contemporary; he ‘was much shrewder commercially  . . . 
[and] made careful inquiries about potential demand . . . [and] undertook fairly elaborate  . . . market 
research’ (Byatt, 1979, pp. 185 – 186). 
Merz had the confidence and backing of NESCo’s newly expanded and strengthened Board of 
Directors. He justified the Board’s high opinion of him and in 1918 a NESCo Director stated that to 
‘Charles (Merz)  . . . is mainly due the unexpected successful development of the North-East coast 
supply of electrical energy to all kinds of purposes which at this date is considered as a unique instance 
and a model of enterprise in the United Kingdom’ (Beard, 1918, p. 2). Merz wrote or oversaw the 
writing of NESCo’s strategy documents.  Supported by NESCo’s engineers and accountants and his 
partner McLellan, Merz was a key figure in the production of strategy Reports in 1903 and 1906. These 
Reports were hybrids of internal and external costing, accounting, engineering, business, legal and 
market data and are the only extant strategy documents in the NESCo archive for the period up to 
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1914. The researchers have used these Reports and other primary and secondary sources in their 
examination of the use of costing in the development and analysis of NESCo’s business and 
technological strategies, in the sub-periods of 1898 -1905; 1906 – 1908; and 1908 – 1914. The nature 
of the construction, content and presentation of the Reports has obliged the current authors to 
undertake considerable analysis in order to present NESCo’s strategies and strategic costing in a 
manner that is coherent yet true to the original Reports.  
6. Costing, strategy and the emergence of NESCo as a power company, 1898 -1905 
 
This section deals with the period which began in 1898 with NESCo’s stated aim to undertake the 
radical change in strategic direction required to transform itself from a local street lighting company 
to a regional power supplier and which ended in 1905, the end of the planning period covered by a 
major comprehensive strategic Report (DU.EB/36/1) prepared at the request of the Directors in order 
to set out and analyse ‘the general position and prospects of the Company’ (DU.EB/36/1, p.3). 
In March 1903, Merz presented this Strategy Report to NESCo’s Chairman and Directors. The Report 
shows the ‘Position of the Company at the end of 1902’ and also sets out its ‘prospects’ 
(DU.EB/36/1/p. 3) through to 1905. The Report was marked ‘STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL’ 
and was signed by Charles Merz, as NESCo’s Consulting Engineer, and J.S. Watson, NESCo’s General 
Manager who was an engineer and, possibly, a relative of NESCo’s founder-Director R.S. Watson. The 
Report reviews NESCo’s historical performance from 1899 - 1902 and sets out strategies, plans and 
estimates for 1903, 1904 and 1905.  
The 1903 Report consists of 19 pages of text supported by 11 schedules, some of which are several 
pages in length, and a series of tables and ‘curves’ (graphs) plus three maps; all documents are printed 
except for the curves which are hand-drawn; hand-written narratives and data have been added to 
the printed maps. In handwritten ‘Notes’ written for his family, Merz states (Beard, 1918, p. 7) his 
views on the presentation of information:  
It was at the commencement of our connection with [NESCo] that we made [our] first plant capacity 
report . . . I had inherited from my father, I think, a liking for clearly thought out reports and we 
illustrated the first one by curves of growth which were not so commonly used in those days as they 
have been since: in fact they are now a feature of every journal report or publication. 
Merz’s views were put into effect in the preparation of the supporting schedules for the 1903 Report 
(DU.EB/36/1, p.14): 
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Attached to this Report are estimates for the next three years. These estimates are given in the form 
of curves, firstly, because we think it is easier to get a grasp of the situation by looking at curves, and 
secondly, because in making the estimates their accuracy is much more easily seen . . . . . Tables of the 
figures corresponding to and taken from the above curves are also attached. 
It is apparent that Merz and Watson took pains to communicate complex information in a form that 
they felt was amenable to understanding by NESCo’s Directors. 
6.1 Markets and power stations 
The North East of England provided its power companies with significant locational advantages. 
Domestic and public lighting consumers were concentrated in densely populated conurbations and 
the ‘industrial importance of the North-East Coast is best shown by the fact that whereas its 
population is less than 5 per cent of that of the United Kingdom, it yields 20 per cent of the total coal, 
35 per cent of the ships, 36 per cent of the coke, 37 per cent of the pig iron and 40 per cent of the 
ironstone produced in the Kingdom’ (Newcastle and Gateshead Chamber of Commerce, 1911, p. 136). 
Thus, as a power company, NESCo had ready access to significant markets. However, despite these 
locational advantages, NESCo faced challenges. At this time, many potential customers used 
alternative energy sources such as gas and steam and had to be persuaded that electricity, and NESCo, 
were viable options. Furthermore, ‘much of the electricity used [in industry] before 1914 was 
generated by users’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 95) themselves rather than by specialist electricity supply 
organisations and these were new markets, still accounting for 60 per cent of British electricity 
generation in 1907, that had to be won (Byatt, 1979, p. 95). Moreover, NESCo faced competition in 
supply from municipalities and other electrical supply companies and ‘had an antiquated system of 
supply [which was] difficult to extend and one from which it was impossible to supply motive power’ 
and which experienced ‘constant faults and interruptions of supply’ and required the ‘laying [of a new] 
distribution system’ (DU.EB/36/1, p.13). NESCo tackled these problems between 1898 and 1903 with 
some financial success (Tables 1, 2 and 3), and in 1903 it noted (DU.EB/36/1/p. 14) that ‘what the 
company has really been doing [since 1898] has been to get ready to supply electrical energy on a large 
scale’ (emphasis added).  
In particular, “getting ready” meant the construction of power stations. NESCo’s emergence and 
success as a large-scale power company was based on its key resource of power stations: specifically, 
Merz and McLellan’s design and construction of revolutionary new power stations which employed 
innovative steam turbine technology in unprecedented ways and on an unrivalled scale. The work of 
Merz and McLellan as consulting engineers ensured that, compared to other British electrical supply 
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companies, NESCo’s power stations were built at low capital cost and they had low operating cost, 
enabling NESCo to adopt a business strategy based on cost leadership. Given these significant 
competitive advantages, NESCo developed and captured markets not only in lighting for domestic, 
public and business purposes, but in power for industry and for transport systems (Byatt, 1979, p. 118 
- 122; DU.EB/36/1, pp. 4 - 6 and 13 – 17; Engineering, 1911; The Statist, 1911). A comparison (Tables 
1, 2 and 3) of NESCo’s financial results for 1902 and those for 1897, its last year as a local lighting 
company, indicates the impact and success of the strategies adopted in its emergence as a power 
company: revenue, £45k (£13k); net profit, £18K (£5K); dividend, 7% (8%); share capital plus 
debentures, £551k (£76k); total assets, £659k (£90k).   
From 1898 - 1901, Merz and McLellan worked as NESCo’s consulting engineers on the design and  
construction of a new power station that NESCo opened in 1901 and, thereafter, they oversaw its 
operation. Merz notes (Beard, 1918, pp. 5-6) that he ‘drew up a scheme for the establishment of a 
power station at Neptune Bank in Newcastle’ and enlisted the help of McLellan, his partner, on this 
project. A NESCo Advisory Committee accepted the design proposed by Merz and McLellan (Byatt, 
1979, p.117; DU.EB 36/1, pp. 4-6), and Merz and his partner ‘worked all hours, frequently going down 
to the office after dinner from 9 p.m. till midnight’. There were many technical problems involved in 
the design of the Neptune Bank Power Station and Merz and McLellan provided technologically 
innovative solutions founded on commercial awareness.  For example, going against conventional 
wisdom, they opted to provide the first British public supply of three-phase current and employed 
induction motors, these being ‘the best suited to deal with the supply [of power] to shipyards’. Whilst 
in the throes of power station design and construction and the supply of electricity, Merz and McLellan 
also paid careful attention to market considerations and the development of a demand for NESCo’s 
electricity. Merz commented (Beard, 1918, p. 6) that, 
Because of the reliability of marine engines and as we thought marine engineers were to be our 
principal consumers we decided to install marine engines in the power station. We also wanted to get 
the engines made on the [River] Tyne . . . All this time Mac and I had an eye to the commercial side, 
viz., the necessity of getting customers, and we had long discussions with the various engineers and 
shipbuilders. There were some prejudices to be overcome; they all wanted to know how much it would 
cost them compared with the numberless steam engines they used, though actually as it turned out 
this was not by any means the most important point for them; the really important point about 
adopting electricity was that it made available for their operations a much more easily adaptable form 
of power; so much did this prove to be the case that within a very few years the different firms we 
connected up to the system were spending two or three times as much on electric power as they had 
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ever spent on steam power – not because electric power was more expensive, but because they 
applied it to so many uses for which, before, they had not used power at all.  
Merz and McLellan were so successful in their dealings with Tyneside shipbuilders that in 1908 Merz 
(Merz, 1908, p. 629) was able to claim that there was not “a single firm of shipbuilders or engineers 
on the north bank of the Tyne inside (NESCo’s) area of supply which does not take 95 per cent of its 
power from the company, the remaining 5 per cent being produced from small gas engines or from 
boilers fired with scrap wood”.  
Charles Parsons, the Newcastle-based engineer, had developed turbines in the 1880s and they had 
become established amongst shipbuilders as a means of providing electric lighting on board ships 
(McGovern and McLean, 2013, p. 7). Merz and McLellan undertook a series of trials and investigations 
and Merz notes that they became convinced that turbines were ‘the possible coming prime mover’ 
(Beard, 1918, p. 7) even though ‘there was not a single large Turbine Unit in operation’ in the country 
(DU.EB/36/1, p. 4). Merz commented (Beard, 1918, p. 8) that he and McLellan adopted turbines 
throughout the Neptune Bank Power Station which opened in 1901 and noted that subsequent actual 
operations ‘proved and justified the principle of the turbine even if we had a good deal of trouble with 
the details of the design’.  
Having successfully launched the Neptune Bank power station, in 1902 NESCo obtained Parliamentary 
approval for its plans to extend northwards into the colliery districts of Northumberland (Beard, 1918, 
p. 8). It also planned a series of joint ventures with other power suppliers and made further plans to 
take over the power supply function of several local authorities (DU.EB 36/1, pp. 9-12) and to enter 
into contracts to supply electricity to the North Eastern Railway (NER) and the Tyneside Tramway 
Company (DU.EB 36/1/12 – 13). Overall demand from NESCo’s consumers led to an increase in the 
firm’s output of electricity from 1 million kilowatt hours in 1899 to 17 million kilowatt hours in 1904 
(Byatt, 1979, p. 118). Confident in the growing demand for electricity, NESCo needed to develop 
additional generating capacity and in 1902 Merz and McLellan began the planning of a new power 
station which opened in 1904, at Carville, near Newcastle (Beard, 1918 p.86). 
It was estimated that Carville added ‘plant capable of working up to some’ 11,000 KW to Neptune 
Bank’s capacity of c. 5,000KW (DU.EB/36/1, p. 6). The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule “O”, Table 
2) notes that in previous years actual demand had been: 1899, 1,050 KW; 1900, 1,300 KW; 1901, 2,825 
KW; and 1902, 4,993 KW. The Report (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule “O”, Table 2) anticipated that extensions 
to Carville would be necessary to meet sharply increasing demand after 1902: 1903, 6,410 KW; 1904, 
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9,540 KW and 1905, 10,670 KW, with maximum demand being between 50 – 60 per cent of KW 
installed (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule “O”, Table 2). 
Whilst the archive does not contain any evidence that financial strategic investment analysis was 
undertaken in respect of the construction of Neptune Bank  or Carville, cost considerations lay at the 
heart of the engineering planning and design process (DU.EB/10/4). Merz considered that the design 
of Carville was a considerable improvement on any design ever employed by anyone previously 
(Beard, 1918, p. 8). In this design, Merz and McLellan worked on the fundamental principle that ‘all 
other considerations are made subservient to the commercial success of the Undertaking as a whole’ 
and noted that the ‘commercial success of [the] undertaking is absolutely dependent upon the 
cheapness and reliability of supply . . . there is a limit in price below which a Supply Company must 
keep if it is to get consumers at all’ (Merz and McLellan, 1904, pp. 696- 697). In their design, Merz and 
McLellan ran counter to the current conventional wisdom by focusing on limiting and controlling 
capital costs rather than running costs. They noted that other engineers employed complex designs 
for power stations in order to enable ease of repair in the eventuality of any and every type breakdown 
but they stated their view that this led to inordinate increases in complexity and capital costs. Merz 
and McLellan adopted a simpler design based on independent units which could be isolated for repair 
in the event of breakdown; moreover they employed an innovative cladded steel-frame building 
instead of the conventional brick building. Their design delivered low capital and operating costs, 
together with ease of repair and expansion of capacity. Carville’s capital cost was £16 per KW, 
compared to £20 - £26 per KW for other contemporary power stations in England and, moreover, its 
running costs were as low as or lower than any other (Byatt, 1979, p. 120).  
In addition to the construction and operation of power stations at Neptune Bank and Carville, NESCo’s 
expansion necessitated the building of four sub-stations, the laying of new cables and the stabilisation 
of current, which required a considerable amount of free wiring and installation for domestic and 
industrial consumers (DU.EB/36/1, pp. 6 – 9). However, the end product of this work was regarded 
with great satisfaction in the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p. 15): 
With regard to the efficiency and economy of the system which has been put down we may remark 
that while the cost of apparatus is continually being reduced we could not, if the whole system had to 
be reconstructed  . . . suggest, even with the experience gained, any alteration in the apparatus used 
which would give greater security against breakdown or lessen the cost of operation. The Company 
now have a system which is capable, with comparatively little extension beyond that of the Generating 
Station, of dealing with any increase in the consumption of electricity in Newcastle itself for a very 
long time to come.   
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Thus justifications for the construction of Neptune Bank or Carville were framed around a strategy of 
cost leadership rather than on financial strategic investment appraisal but they were based on an 
underlying assumption that the demand for electricity would continue to increase. However, a 
warning note was sounded in 1903: NESCo had built its generating capacity in anticipation of 
increasing demand but the present level of output was ‘comparatively small for a power scheme. It is 
necessary to increase output to three or four times its present value if the system is to be used to its 
greatest advantage’ (DU.EB/36/1, p. 16): economies of scale were required. As indicated in the 
following sub-sections, NESCo sought to obtain the increase in output necessary to support its power 
stations by moving to capture and extend markets by means of joint ventures and business links; 
developing its business in traction and in the Northumberland coalfield; and extending its base of 
industrial and domestic consumers.  
6.2 Costing and strategy 
6.2.1, Introduction 
With the help of Watson, in the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1) Merz set out the strategy that had begun, 
and would continue, to shape the emergence of NESCo as a regional electric power company. The 
fundamental strategy of constructing and operating power stations of innovative and radical design 
has been discussed in Section 6.1 above. After careful analysis of the 1903 Report and other primary 
and secondary sources, the researchers conclude that Merz’s strategy for NESCo was based on four 
further main elements: joint ventures; the development of new markets in traction; geographical 
extension to new markets in the Northumberland coalfield; and the extension of its consumer base in 
industrial and domestic markets. Next, this research examines the implication of costing in the 
development and analysis of each of these elements of strategy. 
6.2.2, Joint Ventures and business links 
In 1902, NESCo made a contract with Walker Urban District Council to take over the Council’s 
electricity supply functions (DU.EB/36/1 pp. 10 – 11). Financial analysis of the contract 
(DU.EB/36/1/Schedule D) indicates that NESCo estimated that it would incur a loss of £733 per annum 
for the first eight years of this contract after which time the contract was estimated to generate a 
small annual profit. On the face of it, the acceptance of this contract does not seem to be a particularly 
astute move. However, it was actually part a wider strategy in which NESCo purchased the electrical 
shares of the Walker and Wallsend Union Gas Company (Beard, 1918, pp. 4 – 5), its joint venture 
partner in the construction of the Neptune Bank Power Station. The 1903 Report provided an estimate 
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of the increased profit for 1903 resulting directly from this acquisition (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule C) and 
noted (p. 10) that, while  in financial terms, 
this particular transaction cannot be considered a very great acquisition so far as 1903 is concerned . 
. . [it] has been considered necessary from the Company’s point of view more as a question of policy . 
. . to obtain entire control . . . and thus avoid any risk of the progress of electricity supply being 
prejudiced due to the Gas Company having both a Gas and Electricity Department.  
Merz’s networks enabled him to initiate business links in pursuit of NESCo’s strategy of expansion to 
obtain increases in output. He knew W.L. Magden who was a director of the Durham Electric Power 
Distribution Company and, through this contact (Beard, 1918, p. 8), NESCo entered into an 
‘Agreement’ (DU.EB/36/1, p. 12) with the Durham Company in order to utilize that company’s plant 
and cables during the period that NESCo’s own system was in process of development.  
It was agreed that NESCo would supply electricity to the Durham Company and the financial details 
were set out in the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule E). It was planned that for each of 1903, 1904 
and 1905, NESCo was to invoice the Durham Company on the basis of a three part scheme consisting 
of a fixed annual charge, a fixed rental charge and a variable charge based on electricity consumed. 
The variable price per unit of electricity was planned to be 35d [35 pennies] in 1903 and 1904. The 
1905 variable price per unit was planned to be 35d per unit if Durham’s annual ‘consumption is less 
than 1,000,000 Units’, falling to 30d per unit if Durham’s annual ‘consumption exceeds 1,000,000 
Units’. For each of 1903, 1904 and 1905, Schedule E details NESCo’s planned revenue from each of the 
three parts of the charging scheme and calculates planned total annual revenue.  Although it was 
planned that the agreement for the supply of power would end in the next four to six years, it was 
envisaged (DU.EB/36/1, p. 12) that, there would continue to be  
a permanent connection between the two Companies’ Systems, which, from an engineering point of 
view, we consider advantageous. We have succeeded in getting the Durham Company to adopt the 
same standards with regard to voltage and periodicity as we have adopted on this side of the river. 
We consider it probable that before the agreement expires some further agreement may be come to. 
Thus, Merz drew upon family and business networks and engineering and pricing expertise in order to 
formulate NESCo’s strategies and the strategic analyses relating to the Walker and Wallsend Company 
and the Durham Company.  
6.2.3, New markets: traction companies 
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In 1902, NESCo promoted a Parliamentary Bill for the development of electric tramways on Tyneside 
but was opposed by the NER which felt that its business would be damaged (Byatt, 1979, p. 117). 
However, Merz met with George Gibb, General Manager of NER, and, having convinced him of the 
benefits of electrification, a contract for tramway electrification was made between the two 
companies. The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, pp. 12 -13) lauded this contract as  being beneficial to 
NESCo and noted that the company was not required to incur any capital expenditure beyond the 
construction of another ‘unit’ to extend the capacity of the Carville Power Station. The 1903 Report  
(DU.EB/36/1/Schedule F) presents the following details of the contract: NER would cover the capital 
cost of the sub-station and cables required whilst NESCo would pay an annual rental cost of 5 per cent 
of capital cost; NER would take a minimum of 5 million units of electricity per annum; NESCo’s pricing 
structure was to be: 1.0d per unit for the first 3 million units, 0.75d per unit for the next 3 million units 
and 0.55d per unit for all consumption over 6 million units; caveats specified allowed price reductions 
in the event of future actual running costs being lower than planned costs. In obtaining this contract, 
NESCo offered a very keen pricing structure. Its prices to NER were the ‘minimum’ (DU.EB/36/1, p. 17) 
to be offered to any consumer buying electricity in bulk. Whilst actual unit costs for this period are not 
available in the archive, estimated contract profit statements (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule F) reveal that 
NESCo estimated that its ‘Station and General Expenses’ on the NER contract would be 0.3d per unit 
and that it anticipated making a loss on the NER contract in 1903 but that it planned a return on 
investment of 7.33% for 1904 and 11.2% for 1905.  
The 1903 Report also contains a detailed ‘Statement of Estimated Revenue and Profit from the 
Tyneside Tramways Contract’ (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule G) which indicates an expected annual profit of 
£1,979 on capital expenditure of £21,000. It notes that the c. 10% return on capital was ‘not as large 
as it should be, but the consumption [of electricity] may be expected to increase as the district 
develops, and this will not entail any increase in capital expenditure’. Once again, Merz combined 
costing with engineering expertise, business networks and commercial astuteness in order to develop 
NESCo’s expansion strategies. 
6.2.4, New markets: the Northumberland coalfield 
In 1902, with a view to expanding electricity supply into the Northumberland coalfield, NESCo gained 
Parliamentary approval for its Northumberland Electric Power Bill (Byatt, 1979, p.117), having  
impressed the Parliamentary Committee by its careful estimation of demand, its excellent record of 
technical skill and good management – as revealed by its very low costs, and the way in which it 
anticipated demand in its investment planning. 
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However, the 1903 Report noted (DU.EB/36/1, p. 17) that little progress had been made in pursuing 
this strategy of expansion due to difficulties with a rival company. Nevertheless, Merz understood the 
great potential of this market and continued his efforts with it. On 21st December 1903 he submitted 
a detailed 41 page report (Merz, Specification Number 31.1/23) to NESCo presenting an analysis of 
every colliery in the Northumberland coalfield and indicating its potential for electrification, together 
with a statement of the estimated annual profit that each colliery would bring to NESCo. 
6.2.5, Industrial and domestic consumers 
The 1903 Report indicated (DU.EB/36/1, p. 17) that ‘It will be seen from Curve No. 4 that it is estimated 
that the average price per unit received from [industrial consumers] will gradually decrease’. The curve 
depicts actual and estimated prices per unit between 1899 and 1905, showing falling prices for 
NESCo’s different industrial categories, lighting, small motors and manufacturers, and for the average 
of all categories. 
The development of a pricing strategy was a troublesome exercise for NESCo and the process was not 
eased by the fact that manufacturers expected ‘an excessively low price for power . . . [and] to get 
their lighting thrown in at the same price’ (DU.EB/36/1, pp. 17 – 18). NESCo found it difficult to apply 
separate charges for power and lighting since the same circuits were used for both. Proposals for new 
tariffs were drawn up (DU.EB/36/1/Schedule M) but it is apparent that, in 1903, NESCo was struggling 
to develop its pricing strategy and had not yet found solutions that ‘will not entail a considerable drop 
in revenue to the Company and yet will meet the manufacturers’ wishes’ (DU.EB/36/1, p. 18). 
In contrast, NESCo saw its domestic customer pricing strategy as being very straight forward and the 
1903 Report required (DU.EB/36/1, p. 18) that  
no expenditure be incurred for the extension of mains . . . unless a return on Capital, including House 
Service and Meter, of 15 per cent can be assured . . . these small extensions of a few hundred pounds 
may amount (in total) to a considerable sum in the year and should not be incurred unless it is quite 
certain they will eventually give the requisite return on capital. 
No reason is given for the selection of 15 per cent as the required rate of return on capital and no 
underlying calculations are provided. However, the later Report in 1906 (DU.EB/36/2, p. 20) states 
that NESCo’s required rate of return included ‘8 per cent interest on capital’, the firm having paid an  
ordinary dividend of 8 per cent since 1898 (Table 1). It is probable that the figure of 15 per cent was 
designed to cover interest on capital and to contribute to profit. 
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Thus, the 1903 Report envisages micro-level planning and control in relation to its capturing of 
domestic consumers. 
6.2.6, Capital expenditure 
From a low base in the 1890s, NESCo’s annual capital expenditure grew rapidly in the early 1900s as 
its expansion strategies were enacted: 1899, £29k; 1900, £127k; 1901, £243; 1902, £170k (DU.EB/34). 
The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p. 16) commented that ‘it is essential that further capital expenditure 
be kept as low as possible’ now that its power stations had been constructed and it had  ‘completed 
the main work outside the station in the present distribution area for some time to come’. It is 
apparent that accountants were to have an important role in this process of financial control, 
although, in fact, their performance came in for some criticism (DU.EB/36/1, pp. 16 – 17):  
 a special endeavour was made to get into working order proper Capital Expenditure Return Sheets 
which would actually shew the commitments of the Company from time to time and the increase in 
Capital Expenditure. These Returns, while they have been regularly before the Directors have not 
proved of as much use to the Management as was hoped, due chiefly to the apparent impossibility of 
getting them out sufficiently quickly after the Expenditure had been incurred. 
It has been realised for some time that as the Company have got their main system completed, small 
extensions to Capital [expenditure] should be most carefully dealt with as these amounts may 
gradually run up . . . to a large extent. To guard against this an entirely new form of Capital Expenditure 
Returns has been got out. These returns will be filled in weekly instead of monthly and will merely 
consist of a list of the wages and invoices paid during the preceding week. All new work will be 
allocated to the various Works Order Numbers which are from time to time approved . . . This refers 
to all extensions in Newcastle or in the distribution area, but does not refer to large works such as the 
[Carville Power] Station as it is impossible to deal with such on this basis. 
Even in the case of the Carville [Power] Station, however, revised Return Sheets have been drafted, 
which it is hoped will enable a more careful check to be kept upon the commitments of the Company 
than has hitherto been possible. 
As an additional precaution against any unnecessary debits to Capital Expenditure we have proposed 
and the Directors have sanctioned that all expenses in connection with the Newcastle Office should 
be charged to Revenue, that Capital Expenditure should be dealt with separately at Carville, and that 
only Expenditure at Carville should be charged to Capital. 
7. Costing, strategy and the growth of NESCo, 1906 – 1908 
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This section deals with the period beginning in 1906, the end of the planning period  set out in the 
previous Report (DU.EB/36/1), and ends in 1908, the end of a new planning period covered by a major 
comprehensive strategic Report (DU.EB/36/2) that dealt with all areas of company activity. 
7.1 Introduction 
In 1906, NESCo adopted strategies and systems that enabled it to achieve significant growth (Tables 
1, 2 and 3) and were detailed in a ‘Report on the Position of the Company at the end of 1905 together 
with estimates for 1906 to 1908’ (DU.EB/36/2), covering all aspects of the company’s operations 
including capital expenditure (Schedule No. 8), revenues (Schedule No. 11), costs (Schedule No. 12), 
costs and profits (Schedule No. 13) (Table 4).  
                                                                  INSERT TABLE 4 
The Report was presented to the Chairman and Directors and was marked ‘STRICTLY PRIVATE AND 
CONFIDENTIAL’; it noted (DU.EB/36/2, p. 2) that ‘As the period covered by the previous Report 
[DU.EB/36/1] presented to the Directors in 1903 has now expired, it has been considered advisable to 
prepare a further Report [DU.EB/36/2] along similar lines, dealing with the present position of [NESCo] 
and also with the prospects of the Company’ up to the end of 1908. The Report had three signatories: 
R.P. Sloan, General Manager; J.S. Watson, Technical Director; and M. Short, Company Secretary.  
R.P. Sloan had been one of the first engineers to join the Merz and McLellan partnership of consulting 
engineers. Given the close relationships between the consulting engineers and NESCo, Sloan moved 
to NESCo as General Manager (Beard, 1918, p.6), with J.S Watson stepping down from that position 
to become Technical Manager. As noted above, in connection with the 1903 Report, J.S. Watson was 
an engineer. These engineers were joined as Report preparer and signatory by the Company Secretary, 
M. Short. Biographical details of Short are not available but the Report (DU.EB/23/2/Schedule 5) 
indicates that he had responsibility for the Secretary and Accountant’s Department in NESCo and, 
furthermore, he did initial some financial schedules appended to the Report (DU.EB/36/3/17). The 
three signatories recognised Merz’s contribution to the Report(s) and, perhaps, also acknowledged 
that his imprimatur added authority to it, when stating (DU.EB/36/2, p. 24) that, 
this Report has not been signed by Mr Charles H. Merz, as was the case in the [1903] Report, owing to 
the fact that he was abroad while it was being drafted, but its contents are, to a great extent, the 
results of discussions we have from time to time had with him, and he generally approves the 
conclusions come to, and the estimates we submit for the next three years. 
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The  Report consists of 24 pages of printed text plus a further 28 pages of supporting documents, 
including 22 pages of printed schedules, 5 pages of hand-written schedules, and 1 hand-drafted 
organisation chart. The Report is based on a draft Report (DU.EB/36/3) which consists of 5 pages of 
text and 39 pages of schedules; of these 44 pages, 6 pages are hand-written and the remainder are 
printed or typed. Both the draft and the final Reports are hybrids of internal and external financial, 
costing, engineering, business, legal and market data but there is a distinct shift in content between 
them: in the final Report, engineering and engineering-based costing content is reduced and 
accounting, accounting-based costing and business content is increased. This shift may have been due 
to several factors: the absence of Merz, the direct involvement of the Company Secretary as a Report 
author, and an increasing need to communicate with the Chairman and Directors who were drawn 
from non-electrical engineering backgrounds. Neither the draft nor the final Report contains any 
‘curves’, thought by Merz to be so vital to communication and so much a part of  the 1903 Report. The 
current researchers have examined the 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/2; DU.EB/36/3), other primary 
documents and the secondary literature and have analysed NESCo’s costing for strategy development 
and analysis under four headings: Business Review; Expansion; Costs and Prices; and Power Stations. 
7.2 Costing and strategy 
7.2.1, Business Review 
The final 1906 Report reviewed NESCo’s existing business position and organisation structure as of 
1905. Although the joint venture between NESCo and the Durham Electric Power Distribution 
Company was examined in the 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1; Section 6.2.2, above), the  Report notes 
(DU.EB/36/2, p. 2) that ‘the [closer] arrangement which now exists between the Newcastle and 
Durham Companies was not contemplated’ at that earlier time. On 1st January 1905, a formal 
‘association’ (DU.EB/36/2, p.11) was agreed between these companies. However, this association only 
came into effective operation during the latter part of 1905, resulting in a reorganisation and 
integration of staff and the preparation of an organisation chart (DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 5) showing the 
overlapping structures of these companies and, also, those of Merz and McLellan, the Consulting 
Engineers. The delay in restructuring meant that ‘the economies resulting from this combination were 
materially less than anticipated’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 11). Nevertheless, a comparison 
(DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 1) of ‘the actual results for 1905 as per the balance sheet (and) the estimated 
results as presented in the [1903] Report’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 2) indicates favourable differences in 
respect of all key financial and non-financial performance indicators except for average selling price 
per unit (Table 5). The 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/2) analysed this strong performance and noted the 
favourable impact of new pricing strategies, higher sales volumes and longer contractual periods with 
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the Durham Company, manufacturers, the NER, the Tyneside Tramways and Tramroads Company  and 
several local authorities.  However, it was noted (DU.EB/36/2, p. 30) that ‘energetic’ competition from 
gas companies had caused difficulties in the lighting market; nevertheless, the recommendation of 
the 1903 Report that NESCo should seek a return of at least 15 per cent on capital expenditure for 
lighting ‘had been adhered to as strictly as possible’.  
                                                             INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 Thus, in 1906, it is apparent that NESCo was at pains to clarify and control its organisation structure 
and costs and that it operated a form of strategic financial planning and control: actual and estimated 
results were compared; variances were analysed and explained. In 1906, accountants and their 
symbols, artefacts and language (Carter, Clegg and Kornberger, 2008) were moving towards more 
central roles in the provision of information in NESCo.  
7.2.2, Markets and power stations 
The final 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/1/2, pp. 11 – 14) detailed NESCo’s strategy to extend its geographical 
area of operation and to increase its business with local authorities, collieries and the NER. In relation 
to some of these customers, this Report also provided detailed estimates of revenues, costs and 
profits for 1906, 1907 and 1908 (DU.EB/36/2/Schedules 2 and 3). A further major expansion strategy 
was envisaged to enable the use of ‘waste heat’ from manufacturing companies in order to generate 
electricity and relevant costing analysis was presented (DU.EB/36/2, pp. 21 – 22). It was noted 
(DU.EB/36/3, p. 22) that this highly technical project for ‘waste heat’  
may be considered perhaps the most important which the Newcastle Company has to look forward to 
and one which must be allowed for if the Company is to improve its position, or even maintain its 
present position. 
Detailed schedules were presented indicating the analysis of NESCo’s corporate revenues, costs, 
dividends and retained profits: actual results were presented for 1905, along with estimates for 1906, 
1907 and 1908 (DU.EB/36/2/Schedules 11, 12, 13 and 15). Furthermore, the capital expenditure 
required to facilitate this expansion was examined (DU.EB/36/2, pp. 14 – 15) and analysed by category 
in respect of actual figures for 1905 and estimates for 1906, 1907 and 1908 (DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 8), 
these figures and estimates being a direct transfer from the draft 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/3/Schedule 
1). 
The final 1906 Report (DU.EB/36/2, p.3) noted that the ‘recommendation [regarding distribution 
systems] made in the [1903] Report, that no Capital Expenditure should be incurred unless the 
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estimated results therefrom shewed a Revenue return on Expenditure of at least 15 per cent has been 
adhered to as strictly as possible’. Such a return on investment may have been deemed necessary 
given the needs of ordinary and preference shareholders and debenture holders who had invested 
heavily in the company (Table 2).  
In order to meet market demand for electricity, NESCo undertook extensions of the Carville Power 
Station. By 1906, Carville had a peak capacity of 33,000 KW but also had spare plant with a capacity of 
8,000 KW and it was planned to increase peak capacity by a further 15,000 KW (DU.EB/36/2, p. 14). 
The NESCo archive (DU.EB) does not contain any strategic costing justification or analysis regarding 
extensions at Carville, but, between 1904 and 1910, Carville’s output cost only £10 per kilowatt and 
with ‘Carville as the lowest-cost power station in the country, the [NESCo] system grew rapidly’ (Byatt, 
1979, p. 120). The 1906 Report analysed load factors (DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 14) and noted 
(DU.EB/36/2/p. 20) that ‘If the load factor at Carville could be brought up to 60 per cent, we anticipate 
there will be a reduction in cost  . . . which . . . would mean a saving of £5,000 per year’. Carville 
provided the foundation for NESCo’s emergence and rapid growth (Tables 1, 2 and 3) as a power 
company and in the years 1906 – 10 it provided, on average, 64 per cent of NESCo’s electricity supply 
capacity (Byatt, 1979, p. 122).  
7.2.3, Costs and prices 
Gas companies were in direct competition with NESCo for lighting customers and they also competed 
in the supply of electricity as a motive power by offering the consumer a free ‘gas engine and electric 
generator of sufficient capacity to supply his requirements, the charge made by the Gas Company not 
being on the basis of gas supplied, but so much per unit [of electricity] generated by this plant and 
used by the consumer – these prices being under ¾ d per unit’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 17). Until 1905, NESCo 
had responded to this ‘acute’ competition simply by lowering its own prices to ‘numerous existing 
consumers’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 17) but now, in the context of increasingly diverse groups of customers 
with different requirements for electric supply, it was deemed necessary to instigate specific pricing 
strategies that were based on NESCo’s own costs rather than on responses to competitors’ prices; this 
enabled NESCo to develop competitive and attractive pricing structures for particular consumer 
groups that took account of demand and load factors in order to allocate variable costs, apportion 
fixed costs and fix prices accordingly (DU.EB/36/2, pp. 17 – 20).   
The 1906 Report authors were confident that Merz’s radical and innovative design of the Carville 
Power Station had provided NESCo with a strategic competitive advantage in the cost of generating 
electricity and they noted that ‘After our fully considering the matter with our Engineers, we do not 
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anticipate . . . very much further reduction of cost at Carville except due to an improvement in the 
load factor’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 20). The Report authors thought it necessary to explain that load factor 
‘is a technical term and gives the ratio between units actually consumed and those which would be 
consumed if the consumer used his load continuously throughout the period under consideration’ 
(DU.EB/36/2, p. 18).  Against this background of satisfaction with the costs of generating electricity, 
the Report (DU.EB/36/2, p. 22) changed the focus of attention to, 
whether we cannot revise our costs in such a way as to readily ascertain the accurate cost of 
supplying any consumer and what the probable variation of this cost will be in the future, since, as 
the Company now take on so many long term contracts, an accurate forecast of the cost in 
succeeding years is as important as the present cost. 
Industrial consumers were listed (DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 7) and categorized (DU.EB/36/2, pp. 18 – 20) 
according to their business type and resultant load factor. The Report realised that the distinction 
between fixed and variable costs was crucial in the calculation of the unit cost applicable to each 
category of consumer and hence the price to be charged (DU.EB/36/2, pp. 22 – 24). Definitions of fixed 
and variable costs were set out as ‘it may be useful to clearly define what are meant by these two 
expressions’. However, in addition to normal operating costs, the company sought to include ‘8 per 
cent interest on capital’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 20) as an addition to its fixed cost. Thus, it was noted that 
We have always considered, for the purpose of calculating results, that no profit is really made 
unless the Company first of all obtain a return of 8 per cent on all capital expenditure absorbed by 
the particular supply. 
It was considered that the fixed cost of supply would be constant between each category of consumer 
and that the ‘only increased cost will be the cost of generating the additional amount of electrical 
energy – variable running charges’. The importance of load factor and an understanding of cost 
behaviour in cost calculation and pricing strategy may be seen in the comment that  ‘½d per unit at 60 
per cent load factor pays [NESCo] better than 0.85d per unit at 30 per cent load factor’ (DU.EB/36/2, 
p. 20). 
Based on their considerations, the authors of the 1906 Report submitted a four-page ‘Analysis of 
Costs and Revenue’ (DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 14). The first page of this schedule contains calculations 
of four constants required to allow for the impact of ‘Diversity Factors’ : K1, between Generating 
Station and Substation loads; K2, in Loss in Transmission between Generating Stations and 
Substations and Transformation in Substations; K3  , between Substations and Direct Current 
Consumers’ and K4 , Loss in Distribution between the Substations and Direct Current Consumers’ 
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Terminals. These constants were then employed in the second, third and fourth pages of the 
schedule in the calculation of actual figures for 1905 and estimates for 1906, 1907 and 1908, 
depicting costs per kilowatt for: capital charges, fixed costs, variable costs and total costs at load 
factors of 10 per cent, 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 100 per cent, and, also, revenues per kilowatt. 
The 1906 Report acknowledged that this was a ‘revised way’ of analysing costs and revenue but 
argued that ‘it is essential that costs should be made out in this way’ (DU.EB/36/2, p. 23).  
Although the authors of the 1906 Report did not make any recommendation regarding pricing 
strategy, they did itemise (DU.EB/36/2, p.24) alternative cost-based methods of charging consumers 
for the consideration of the Chairman and Directors: 
(1) Fixed charge per annum plus unit charge 
(2) Fixed sum per “Unit of Output of Manufacture” 
(3) Fixed lump sum per annum – the “Output of Manufacture” being taken at some definite 
quantity 
(4) Fixed charge per annum per horse-power or per kilowatt of motors installed – independent 
of number of units consumed 
(5) Fixed charge per horse-power or per kilowatt demanded – independent of number of units 
consumed. 
Low capital and operating costs were key elements underlying NESCo’s competitive and pricing 
strategies, as is indicated by its advertisement of ‘Cheap Electrical Power’ and ‘Electric Power supplied 
at Cheap Rates’ (Newcastle and Gateshead Chamber of Commerce, 1911, xxviii) in a bid to attract 
industrial consumers. Also, in pursuit of industrial consumers, NESCo agreed ‘to let on hire or hire-
purchase the whole of the electric machinery required for a new works’; it bought land ‘to lease such 
sites for long terms at very cheap rates’; and it provided a consulting service of ‘a specially trained 
staff of experts [in order to advise customers on]  the engineering and financial problems  incidental 
to the establishment of new works . . . and to give information regarding such matters as general 
traffic facilities, labour, and the obtaining of raw materials etc.’ (Newcastle and Gateshead Chamber 
of Commerce, 1911, p. 137).  
8. Costing, strategy and the growth of NESCo, 1908 – 1914  
The NESCo archive (DU.EB) does not contain any strategic Reports or strategic costing analyses for the 
period 1908 – 1914, and the authors have not discovered any references to such Reports or analyses 
in the archive. It is possible that such documents were produced but that they have not survived the 
vagaries of time. However, the authors judge that it is probable that they were not produced at all, 
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simply because they were not needed: NESCo’s strategies and modus operandi remained unchanged 
during this period and were simply the continuation of what had gone before. In terms of planning, 
NESCo’s focus was the same in this period as it had been in the years immediately after its change of 
strategic direction in 1898, that is on the engineering planning and design of a power station and the 
development of markets. NESCo was the one exception to the norm that British electricity power 
companies had power stations that were, essentially, scaled-up versions of lighting stations from the 
turn of the century (Byatt, 1979, p. 96). Having established itself with the design, construction and 
operation of the Neptune Bank and Carville Power Stations, the design and use of safe power stations 
with low capital and operating costs continued to be the fundamental strategy underlying NESCo’s 
success, as evidenced by a new power station that opened in 1910 in Dunston, near Newcastle. Each 
NESCo power station ‘marked an advance on the previous one technically and from the standpoint of 
economy’ (Beard, 1918, p. 10); the Dunston Power Station had 23,000 KW capacity, was built at a cost 
of £11 per KW, ‘well below the national average’ (Byatt, 1979, p.122), and it provided the basis for 
NESCo’s continued growth through to 1914.  
By 1914, NESCo was the one successful British power company and it had developed a ‘grid extending 
from the Northumberland coalfield to the Cleveland iron ore field. In 1912 it had 42 per cent of total 
[British] generating capacity . . . and accounted for 12 per cent of total sales of electricity [direct to 
end-use consumers] in Britain’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 114), the apparent discrepancy between these 
numbers being accounted for by the bulk electricity supplies that NESCo provided to municipalities 
and other power companies (Byatt, 1979, p. 122). 
9. NESCo: costing and management control 
From its inception, NESCo had calculated power station unit costs on a routine basis but the 1903 
Report (DU.EB/36/1, p. 19) noted that, to date, perhaps too much attention had been focused on ‘the 
cost per unit at the Power Station, which for the present has reached the lowest practical point’. Now, 
it was necessary to re-focus in order to pay attention to ‘standing outside expenses and to the general 
expenses in the offices’ which were a large proportion of total production cost. This issue was to be 
dealt with by two means: first, increasing output; second, ‘proper organisation and the saving of 
duplicate work’. The 1903 Report (DU.EB/36/1, p.19) ended by stating: 
In the reduction of routine expenditure we attach considerable importance to the increased assistance 
and attention which can now be given to and by the Accountants Department and the returns which 
they get out. It is hoped that, in the future more than in the past, the combined and united efforts of 
all departments may be directed towards a reduction both of Costs and Routine Capital Expenditure. 
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In making this statement, the Report authors simply emphasised the need to develop and employ 
appropriate financial controls in the management of NESCo as a rapidly growing but financially sound 
company. However, although the 1903 and 1906 Reports (DU.EB/36/1; DU.EB/36/2) set out detailed 
annual financial plans covering the period 1903 – 1908, there is no evidence that NESCo developed a 
routine budgetary control system on a departmental or organisational basis. Nevertheless, tight 
managerial and financial control was exercised directly over capital expenditure projects and over 
contracts with individual consumers. Moreover, documentation dating from 1898 (DU.EB/1/5) and 
1900 (DU.EB/5/1) indicates that NESCo prepared weekly cost sheets, fuel accounts and output sheets 
that were used for managerial control purposes but, unfortunately, these records have not survived 
in the archive.  
In 1903, Short, the Company Secretary, undertook a re-organisation of NESCo. He produced a 
comprehensive ‘Staff List’ (DU.EB/43)  which presented not only the activities or ‘duties’ performed in 
each and every staff job within the firm but also named the individual people performing those 
activities, together with a note of their earnings. NESCo employed a total of 90 members of staff: 30 
were categorised as ‘Technical’;  25, including the Accountant, Bookkeeper and two cost clerks, were 
listed as ‘Secretarial’; 14 were employed at the Neptune Bank Power Station; and 21 were employed 
at Carville Power Station. The archive does not contain any record of non-staff employees. By 1906, 
NESCo had a clear organisation structure depicted in a formal organisation chart (DU.EB/36/2, 
Schedule No. 5). The organisation chart (DU.EB/36/2/Schedule 5) and the ‘Staff List’ (DU.EB/43) 
indicate that NESCo employed clear lines of responsibility and accountability. In line with other firms 
of the Second Industrial Revolution (e.g. McLean et al, 2015), it is probable that NESCo exercised 
direct, personal control over staff although there is no direct evidence to confirm this. 
10. The regulatory-political environment and strategic costing 
In the early nineteenth century, there was little Government regulation of utilities. However, after 
1850, gas and water companies were required to obtain Government franchises in order to operate. 
The Tramways Act of 1870 required intending ‘tramway operators . . . to apply for a Provisional Order 
from the Board of Trade [in order] to operate under the general conditions of the Act’ and it ‘provided 
for the compulsory purchase of a tramway by the local authority twenty-one years after the granting 
of the Provisional Order’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 198). The Electric Lighting Act of 1882 was modelled on the 
Tramways Act of 1870. Intending suppliers of electricity were required to obtain from the Board of 
Trade either a Licence, giving rights of supply for seven years, or a Provisional Order, giving rights of 
supply for twenty-one years after which time it could pass into the ownership of the local authority 
by compulsory purchase. However, ‘many people felt that this Act had hindered [the emergence] of 
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electricity supply too much’ and in 1888, the compulsory purchase ‘clause was amended to forty-two 
years’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 199). This amendment of 1888 stimulated Robert Spence Watson and Theodore 
Merz to instigate the incorporation of NESCo in January 1889 (Beard 1918). NESCo obtained the 
necessary support from Newcastle Corporation and, on 7th March 1889, applied to the Board of Trade 
for a Licence to operate in Newcastle. The Licence was granted and NESCo operated under it for three 
years until it applied for Provisional Orders. Newcastle Corporation opposed this application and, in 
order for the Corporation to drop this opposition, NESCo was obliged to accept a compromise term 
under Provisional Orders of thirty-one years rather than the usual forty-two years. 
Hannah (1979) notes that there were tensions between electricity industry regulators and supply 
organisations but Byatt (1979, p. 197) indicates that although legislation was ‘a significant factor’ in 
the emergence of the electricity supply industry, ‘it should be put in its proper context – as part of an 
attempt to regulate natural monopolies in the public interest in an economic atmosphere still 
dominated by laissez-faire views’. Nevertheless, as Hausman, Herner and Wilkins (2008, p. 23) note 
the very nature of electricity led to political involvement in the emerging electricity supply industry, 
Because energy cannot easily be stored . . . it becomes possible for a utility to engage in price 
discrimination, charging different prices to different consumers, a practice that could well lead to 
higher profits. This situation could pit groups of consumers against one another, and the tensions this 
produced could be played out in the political arena. As electricity became more ubiquitous and more 
essential .  . . the requirement that utilities have government approval at least for their distribution 
systems made them dependent on politicians, and made their behaviour an object of political concern. 
Thus, the electricity supply industry did have a demanding regulatory-political environment; every 
formation of a municipal or corporate electricity supply organisation required Parliamentary consent 
and every extension of supply required the consent of local and/or national government. NESCo 
required multiple Acts of Parliament and Provisional Orders (PA 122) in order to develop its business 
and, moreover, the company engaged in frequent disputes and negotiations resulting in legal 
agreements with municipalities and landowners regarding the granting of wayleaves for its 
distribution systems (DU.EB/47, DU.EB/156/4). The strategic Report of 1906 (DU.EB/36/2) devoted 
pages 11 – 14 to discussions of NESCo’s plans for the promotion of Bills and Provisional Orders in 
Parliament.  As a solicitor, Spence Watson provided NESCo with legal expertise in its submissions to 
Parliament and local corporations (Beard, 1918). Moreover, as an original convenor of the National 
Liberal Federation in 1874, its President from 1890 – 1902, and the most prominent Liberal leader 
outside of Parliament (Corder, 1914), Spence Watson had political expertise and networks to bring to 
bear in NESCo’s regulatory-political environment, both nationally and locally. Nationally, for example, 
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Sir James Kitson, Spence Watson’s predecessor as President of the National Liberal Federation, ‘sat as 
Chairman of the Select Committee of the [House of] Commons which dealt with many of the Power 
Bills of 1900 and 1901’ (Byatt, 1979, 203). Rather laconically, Beard (1918, p. 7) notes that NESCo was 
‘fortunate in having as Chairman of the Committee that considered all the Power Bills . . . Sir James 
Kitson’ as these Bills enabled the company’s expansion by providing it with the authority to supply 
power over large areas. Locally, for example, T.G. Gibson, J.P. was a Newcastle businessman and 
Alderman who Spence Watson recruited to supply finance to NESco and to become Company Director 
and Chairman, 1889 – 1911, whilst also providing the firm with an influential ally in the political arena 
(Beard, 1918; NESCo, 1948). 
In 1898, Parliament gave approval for Newcastle Corporation to construct an electricity power station. 
In response to this entry into the market, NESCo and a competitor company each applied to Parliament 
for permission to develop a scheme for the whole district. The strengths of Spence Watson combined 
with the expert witness testimony of Charles Merz were key factors in a Parliament Committee headed 
by Sir James Kitson giving it, rather than a rival company, approval to develop a district scheme. In 
dealing with another proposed NESCo scheme in 1902, a Parliamentary Select Committee [dealing 
with NESCo] commended Merz on his careful estimation of demand and the way in which he linked 
his investment plans to estimates of demand’ (Byatt, 1979, pp. 185 – 186). Furthermore, as Hughes 
(1993, pp. 453) notes, Merz was  
believed by many to be the most effective expert witness in the engineering world. In presenting his 
case he used highly imaginative statistical tables, graphs and charts . . . [In NESCo, he] articulated and 
disseminated the economic and technological principles of regional [electric power] systems. He took 
into account the technological and economic givens and forged strategy and tactics for NESCo. 
NESCo’s emergence and expansion as a successful power company and its dominance over its 
competitors may be explained, in part at least, by the manner in which Robert Spence Watson and 
Charles Merz in particular dealt with the regulatory-political environment. NESCo had no legal or 
regulatory obligation to produce costing information but Charles Merz’s expert witness testimony to 
Parliament, in which he presented convincing business strategies based on sound strategic costing 
information, was fundamental to NESCo’s ability to operate successfully in the regulatory-political 
environment of the emerging electricity supply industry. In turn, the Reports (DU.EB/36/1; 
DU.EB/36/2) were pivotal in giving full expression to NESCo’s business strategies and strategic costing. 
11. Discussion and Conclusions  
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The research literature on the ‘old’ industries of coal, iron and steel (e.g. Boyce, 1992,; Boyns and 
Edwards, 1995; Boyns and Edwards, 1997; Edwards et al, 1995; Pitts, 2001) and shipbuilding and 
engineering (e.g. McLean, 2006; McLean et al, 2015) provides evidence of the implication of costing 
in the production of strategic reports. In contrast, the limited literature on the ‘new’ industries of the 
Second Industrial Revolution (McKinstry, 1999; McLean, 2006; McLean 2013; McLean et al, 2015) 
notes an absence of thoroughgoing strategic reviews, although it does indicate the role of costing in 
one-off strategic decisions. The current article represents a valuable addition to this limited literature; 
it presents a detailed case study of NESCo’s costing for strategy development and analysis, 1889 – 
1914, and it provides evidence that, in 1903 and 1906 , NESCo produced Reports that were 
comprehensive in their considerations of business and technological strategies and that employed 
costing information in the development, analysis and review of these ongoing strategies. Thus, the 
current research indicates the existence of a continuity, rather than a break, in the implication of 
costing in strategy development and analysis from the First to the Second Industrial Revolution. 
This research finds that a combination of three major factors underlay NESCo’s adoption of systematic, 
formal considerations of strategy and its use of costing for strategy development and analysis. First, 
the novelty, scale and complexity of the electricity supply industry and the firm were such that strategy 
was best thought through from first principles in a formal manner and costing was an essential aid to 
the formulation of strategic plans and analyses. Second, NESCo operated in a regulated environment; 
its effective, formal submissions to Parliament of its strategy and strategic costing were essential 
elements in gaining the required approval for expansion and had natural corollaries in its strategic 
Reports (DU.EB/36/1; DU.EB/36/2). Third, and crucially, Charles Merz had the ability and the drive to 
develop NESCo’s strategy and to formulate and enact an appropriate approach to the provision of 
costing information for strategy development and analysis; moreover, NESCo’s electrical engineers 
and accountants were able to extend and develop his work. This third finding confirms the importance 
of key players in accounting and costing as noted in the historical literature (McLean, 2013; McLean 
et al, 2015; McLean and Tyson, 2006; Yamey, 1981). 
Many studies (e.g. Hopwood, 1987; Napier, 2006; Quinn, 2014) have validated the use of history in 
the study of contemporary accounting and costing. Carnegie and Napier (2012, p. 329) argue that 
‘History can inform our appreciation of contemporary accounting thought and practice through its 
power of unifying past, present and future . . . history provides a framework for evaluating 
accounting’s impacts on individuals, organisations and society not just in the past but also today’. As 
an accounting historian, Jones (2008, p. 1053) provides a cautionary note by indicating that ‘when 
interpreting the past through the lens of the present, it is necessary to beware anachronisms’. 
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However, the issue of anachronism has long been debated within the wider historical community (e.g. 
Jardine, 2000; Poe, 1996; Tosh, 2003) and, although the dangers are recognised, an accepting, 
nuanced approach has developed. Hoskin and Macve (1996, p.337) argue for the adoption of a 
balanced approach that recognises ‘the dangers of anachronism when considering the accounting 
practices of earlier times, and the importance of allowing modern intent in such accounting only after 
the most stringent scrutiny of the evidence’. Thus, the researchers have proceeded cautiously and 
have employed stringent scrutiny in employing history in order to develop an analysis that has both 
historical and contemporary relevance. Therefore, next, the authors consider the implications of their 
historical findings for contemporary research in four areas of strategic costing/strategic management 
accounting (SMA).  
First, the contemporary SMA literature may be viewed in the light of the orientation of NESCo’s 
strategic costing. Nixon and Burns (2012a, p. 229) argue that much of the SMA literature is based on 
‘Michael Porter’s industry analysis model and generic competitive strategies’ and, for example, they 
note that Simmonds (1981, p. 26) defined SMA as ‘the provision and analysis of management 
accounting data about a business and its competitors, for use in developing and monitoring business 
strategy’. However, they state (2012a, p. 229) that whilst strategic management has moved to a ‘more 
internal, resource-based view of the firm and competitive advantage [this] has been mostly neglected 
by the extant SMA literature’. The NESCo case indicates that, throughout its emergence as a regional 
power company, 1898 – 1914, the firm’s strategies were based on complementary understandings 
and analyses of its internal resources as well as its external competitive market environment. Thus, 
the NESCo case explores the strategic implications of internal, resource-based assessments of the firm 
and, thereby, provides a useful counterpoint to the contemporary SMA literature, an addition to our 
very limited knowledge of SMA in practice and a complement to the few studies which relate 
accounting, strategic management and the resource-based view of the firm (e.g. Bowman and Toms, 
2010). 
Second, the equations of SMA simplicity-complexity and cost-benefit must be considered. In relation 
to contemporary SMA, Guilding et al (2000, p.117) list 12 SMA techniques and Cadez and Guilding 
(2008, p. 839) extend this list to 16 techniques represented in the SMA literature: attribute costing; 
life cycle costing; quality costing; target costing; value-chain costing; benchmarking; integrated 
performance measurement; strategic cost management; strategic pricing; brand valuation; 
competitor cost assessment; competitive position monitoring; competitor performance appraisal; 
customer profitability analysis; lifetime customer profitability analysis; valuation of customers as 
assets. Nevertheless, Guilding et al (2000, p. 113) acknowledge that ‘Most of the SMA [techniques in 
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their list] are not widely used’. Historically, firms of the late nineteenth – early twentieth century were 
very aware of the costing cost-benefit equation and took great care to limit the costs of costing by 
operating simple systems that produced information that was beneficial and readily understood 
(McLean, 2013; McLean et al 2015). NESCo’s strategic costing covered important areas of internal and 
external analysis; conceptually, it was based on an understanding of the nature of fixed and variable 
costs and it presented information to the reader in a straightforward manner, without the 
accompaniment of a wide range of terminologies. Moreover, NESCo did not attempt to undertake 
strategic costing on a continuing, ongoing basis; it produced only two Reports (DU.EB/36/1; 
DU.EB/36/2) based on strategic costing and these Reports were produced at times when there were 
distinct needs for strategic information. After 1906, when strategies remained constant, no further 
Reports were produced. Nixon and Burns (2012a, p.229) note that there is ‘an inherent contradiction 
between the apparent decline of SMA and the sustained growth in the number of concepts, models, 
tools, theoretical perspectives, disciplines, academic and professional journals and consultancy 
practices that populate the SMA domain . . . [SMA is a] paradox’. This SMA ‘paradox’ may be related 
to the equations of simplicity-complexity and cost-benefit that were well understood by NESCo and 
other firms operating in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century. 
Third, is a consideration of the ‘role of accountants in the adoption and implementation of SMA’ 
Langfield-Smith (2008, p. 219). Powell (2014, p. 201 - 3) notes that, ‘it pays to remember that the 
empirical world of strategy and organization is more personal than impersonal . . [but] few traces of 
personalism remain in contemporary theories of competitive advantage . . .  People have vanished 
almost completely from the story’, and Fauré and Rouleau (2011, p. 169) argue that ‘organization 
strategy cannot be reduced to the formal discourse authored by top management and disseminated 
through . . . the official organizational communication system’. The current historical research brings 
people back into the story but indicates clearly that a key individual and a small group of top managers 
can employ a formal discourse in order to have a profound influence on strategy and the production 
of strategic costing information. The NESCo case emphasises the importance of non-accountants, 
specifically electrical engineers, in the provision of strategic costing information and indicates that the 
contribution of external consultants, as experienced in the ‘old’ industries of coal, iron and steel 
industries (Boyns and Edwards, 1995; Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd, 2001; Pitts, 2001), 
continued to be relevant in the electrical supply industry of the Second Industrial Revolution. It may 
be noted that costing textbook author (Garke and Fells, 1887) Emile Garke was an electrical engineer 
who ‘specialised in retrenchment and financial management’ (Byatt, 1979, p. 189) and worked in both 
the Brush Electric Lighting Company (Section 3. above) and the Durham Electric Power Distribution 
Company (Section 6.2.2, above). It is suggested that future research should examine the contrasting 
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roles of key individuals and others, and of formal and informal discourses in the processes of costing 
for strategy development and analysis. 
 Nixon and Burns (2012a, p.241) recognise that contemporary SMA ‘belongs to the [management] 
team’ but they argue that ‘accountants are likely to have a competitive advantage in compiling and 
using financial numbers . . .and ensuring a consistent application of financial criteria in decisions’. 
However, in NESCo, engineers were key figures who played crucial roles in both the development of 
strategy and in the preparation of underlying strategic costing information. Nevertheless, the 1906 
Report (DU.EB/36/2) does provide evidence of an increasingly important strategic role for accountants 
and accounting-based costing and it must be recognised that the boundaries of accounting are in a 
constant process of definition and redefinition as a body of expertise is created: ‘accounting is 
permeable to other bodies of expertise. Accounting has been made and re-made by borrowing 
calculative technologies and rationales from a disparate range of knowledges and associated ideals . . 
. The criteria for what can count as accounting are historically contingent and only temporarily 
stabilized’ (Miller, 1998, pp. 618 - 619; italics in original). As in the case of NESCo, interaction between 
accounting and other bodies of expertise, such as electrical engineering, can lead to hybridisation 
where ‘new phenomena [are] produced out of two or more elements normally found separately’ 
(Miller, Kurunmäki and O’Leary, 2008, p. 943). Moreover, it is through ‘a specific class of hybrids  . . . 
formed at . . . intersections such as those between financial calculation and technological dreams . . . 
that a particular modality of intervening to manage uncertainty emerges and is made possible’(Miller 
et al, 2008, p. 945). NESCo’s strategic costing represents such an intersection. However,  Miller et al, 
note (2008, p. 942) that the’ existing literature . . . has largely neglected the hybrid practices, processes 
and expertises that make possible lateral information flows and coordination across the boundaries 
of organisations, firms and groups of experts or professionals’. NESCo’s strategic costing was the 
hybrid outcome of the work of consultants and company personnel who applied electrical 
engineering-based costing and accounting-based costing; the researchers suggest that the further 
study of hybrids has much to offer the historical and contemporary strategic costing/SMA literatures.  
Fourth, this article presents a view of strategic investment appraisal that augments the contemporary 
literature (e.g. Carr, Kolehmainen and Mitchell, 2013; Haka, 2007; Miller and O’Leary, 2007; Skærbaek 
and Tryggestad, 2010). Hausman et al (2008, p.19) note that ‘With the exception of steam railways 
during that industry’s formative years, no other public utility or manufacturing industry came close to 
approaching the capital intensity of the electric power industry from its inception in the late 
nineteenth century up to World War I’. However, NESCo did not apply formal financial investment 
appraisal techniques to its most significant large scale, long term, strategic projects, that is to the 
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building of new power stations. Instead, NESCo investment strategy was based on detailed market 
research allied to an exponential growth in demand for electricity together with innovative power 
station design, leading to cost leadership in the market place; formal financial investment appraisal 
techniques were used only for more limited, smaller scale, shorter term, capital projects. Thus, 
NESCo’s use of strategic investment appraisal techniques was more limited than that presented in the 
contemporary literature but, nevertheless, its strategic investment strategies were very effective in 
the context of its time and circumstances. 
In conclusion, the authors find that, essentially, NESCo’s costing was a ‘strategic and commercial 
technology’ (Ahrens and Chapman, 2007, p. 3) employed to underpin strategy development and 
analysis. The current study confirms the validity of undertaking further archive studies in order to 
extend our historical knowledge of costing in emerging industries and to employ these historical 
findings in the analysis of contemporary costing issues. Of particular interest to the current authors is 
the work of Kraus and Lind (2007, p. 295) who indicate the need for further research in the field of 
control and control systems in contemporary inter-organisational relationships. Given the close 
personal and business links that existed between NESCo and, for example, Merz and McLellan, the 
Walker and Wallsend Union Gas Company, the Durham Electric Power Distribution Company, and the 
NER, the current authors feel that the NESCo archive offers rich opportunities for further research in 
order to extend our historical and contemporary knowledge of control and control systems in inter-
organisational relationships in emerging industries. 
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Table 1        NESCo Profit and Loss Account Extracts (£000), 1891 - 1914 
       
                   
Year 
         
Revenue 
                
Gross 
                     
Net 
         
Ordinary 
    
Preference 
    
Debenture 
  
                
Profit 
                 
Profit 
          
Dividend 
         
Dividend 
          
Interest 
1891 4 2 1 4% 
                          
- 6% 
1892 6 3 2 4% 
                          
- 6% 
1893 7 2 1 4% 
                          
- 6% 
1894 8 3 2 4% 
                          
- 5% 
1895 9 4 2 5% 
                          
- 5% 
1896 10 5 3 5% 
                          
- 5% 
1897 13 7 5 7% 
                          
- 5% 
1898 15 8 5 8% 
                          
- 
                          
- 
1899 17 9 6 8% 
                          
- 
                          
- 
1900 20 9 9 8% 5% 
                          
- 
1901 23 13 11 8% 5% 4% 
1902 45 27 18 8% 5% 4% 
1903 76 43 28 8% 5% 4% 
1904 109 61 41 8% 5% 4% 
1905 140 69 50 8% 5% 4% 
1906 177 81 52 8% 5% 4.50% 
1907 241 82 57 8% 5% 4.50% 
1908 
                           
- 69 44 5% 5% 4.50% 
1909 
                           
- 95 65 4% 5% 4.50% 
1910 
                           
- 98 64 4% 5% 4.50% 
1911 
                           
- 107 70 4.50% 5% 4.50% 
1912 
                           
- 115 76 5% 5% 4.50% 
1913 
                           
- 134 105 5.50% 5% 5% 
1914 
                           
- 156 132 5.50% 5% 5% 
       
          Sources: compiled from NESCo Annual Reports, DU.EB/34  
       
         
Notes:       
       
         a. Gross Profit is calculated after tax but before interest  
         b. Net Profit is calculated after interest but before dividends 
         c. Annual Reports were not published in 1889 and 1890  
         d. Revenue figures were not reported in and after 1908.  
         e. Preference dividend data are not available for 1889 - 1899 
         f. Debenture interest data are not availble for 1898 - 1900  
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          Table 2 NESCo Summary Capital and Liabilities (£000), 1891 - 1914  
         
                   
Year 
         
Ordinary 
        
Reserves 
                 
Total 
    
Preference 
  
Debentures 
                
Loans 
            
Current 
               
TOTAL         
                 
Share 
                
Equity 
               
Share 
         Liabilities 
             
Capital 
              
Capital 
    
1891 19 1 20 
                           
- 15 
                  
- 
6 41 
1892 26 1 27 
                           
- 15 
                  
- 
3 45 
1893 29 2 31 
                  
- 
17 
                  
- 
4 52 
1894 34 1 35 
                  
- 
20 
                  
- 
5 60 
1895 39 2 41 
                  
- 
20 
                  
- 
4 65 
1896 46 2 48 
                  
- 
20 
                  
- 
16 84 
1897 46 5 51 
                           
- 25 
                           
- 14 90 
1898 53 11 64 
                  
- 
25 
                  
- 
17 106 
1899 90 25 115 
                  
- 
                  
- 
18 7 140 
1900 93 47 140 52 
                  
- 
47 39 278 
1901 124 80 204 125 
                  
- 
158 36 523 
1902 203 38 241 170 140 62 46 659 
1903 266 143 409 245 250 79 92 1,075 
1904 371 179 550 357 250 55 60 1,272 
1905 375 229 604 375 250 61 137 1,427 
1906 417 100 517 400 381 31 176 1,505 
1907 438 121 559 438 438 182 95 1,712 
1908 688 120 808 688 439 13 55 2,003 
1909 688 153 841 688 688 1 91 2,309 
1910 688 157 845 688 688 1 56 2,278 
1911 688 182 870 688 688 3 106 2,355 
1912 688 173 861 688 688 146 93 2,476 
1913 738 199 937 688 1,088 8 82 2,803 
1914 798 224 1,022 912 1,088 66 108 3,196 
         
          Sources: compiled from NESCo Annual Reports, DU.EB/34   
         
         Note:        
         a. Annual Reports were not published in 1889 and 1890    
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  Table 3         NESCo Summary Assets (£000), 1891 - 1914  
       
                   Year                  Fixed   Investments             Current                 TOTAL                   Total 
               Assets                Assets                Assets  
                      Index 
1891 35                   - 6 41 100  
1892 41                   - 4 45 110  
1893 46                   - 6 52 127  
1894 54                   - 6 60 146  
1895 60                   - 5 65 158  
1896 77                   - 7 84 205  
1897 82                            - 8 90 234  
1898 98                   - 8 106 259  
1899 127                   - 13 140 341  
1900 256                   - 22 278 678  
1901 499                   - 24 523 1,276  
1902 569                   - 90 659 1,607  
1903 1,025                   - 50 1,075 2,622  
1904 1,166 26 80 1,272 3,102  
1905 1,216 115 96 1,427 3,480  
1906 1,239 109 157 1,505 3,671  
1907 1,458 87 167 1,712 4,176  
1908 1,641 158 204 2,003 4,885  
1909 1,787 163 359 2,309 5,632  
1910 1,898 139 241 2,278 5,556  
1911 1,975 105 275 2,355 5,744  
1912 2,122 73 281 2,476 6,039  
1913 2,337 59 407 2,803 6,677  
1914 2,448 366 382 3,196 7,795  
       
          Sources: compiled from NESCo Annual Reports, DU.EB/34 
       
         Note:      
a. Annual Reports were not published in 1889 and 1890 
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